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Introduction 
 Picture the following situation:  A police officer pulls you over, or shows up at your 
house with an arrest warrant.  You are placed in the back of a police car.  During your ride to the 
police station, or while seated in the back of the car, the police officer asks you questions about 
the crime you’re accused of committing.  Would you answer the questions? Would you feel free 
to leave?  Would you feel free to terminate your interactions with the police officer?  Do you 
consider yourself a reasonable person? 
 Miranda v. Arizona created an important standard in the law of criminal procedure in the 
United States.
1
  It ensures that those subject to custodial interrogations will be informed of their 
constitutional rights.  These constitutional rights include the individual’s right to remain silent, 
that anything they say can and will be used against them in a court of law, and that they have the 
right to an attorney.
2
   Miranda warnings are not required in every police interaction.
3
  Rather, 
the law requires that Miranda warnings be issued when two factors are present: that the 
individual was in custody, and that the police interrogated them.
4
  The law since Miranda, 
however, has struggled to define exactly what conditions and circumstances define a “custodial 
                                                        
1
 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
2
 See Id. at 476. 
3
 Id. 
4
 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); R.I. v. Innis, 446 U.S. 
291, 380 (1980). 
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interrogation,” and thus require Miranda warnings.5  One factual circumstance that has resulted 
in a federal circuit split is whether an individual placed in the back of a police car should be 
considered “in custody” for purposes of Miranda warnings.6   
 Currently, when the issue is the admissibility of a statement made without Miranda 
warnings, courts use a reasonable person standard based on the totality of the circumstances to 
establish whether the individual was in custody.
7
  Courts analyze whether the person felt free to 
leave the situation, or whether their movement was restrained to the degree of a formal arrest.
8
  
This comment proposes a restructuring of the totality of the circumstances analysis by placing a 
stronger emphasis on the inherently coercive nature of the environment of a police car.  I propose 
creating a rebuttable presumption, which asserts that a person is seized when they are questioned 
in the back of a police car, and thus should be considered “in custody.” The proposed 
presumption is rebuttable by the prosecution asserting certain facts that include whether the 
individual was told he was free to leave, was not handcuffed, or was not restrained in any 
manner.  Ultimately, because no reasonable person would feel free to get out of the back of a 
police car and walk away once placed there by a police officer, this presumption renders the 
coercive environment the most important factor in the custody determination analysis.    
  Part I of this comment will address the background of relevant constitutional law, 
namely Miranda v. Arizona and the cases that followed it that defined custodial interrogations.  
The background section will also address the current federal circuit split that exists on this issue. 
Part II of this comment addresses the proposed presumption as well as the facts that can be 
                                                        
5
 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544 (1980); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984). 
6
 See United States v. Henley, 984 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1992); Figg v. Shroeder, 321 F.3d 625 (4
th
 Cir. 2002); United 
States v. Richardson, 949 F.2d 851 (6
th
 Cir. 1991); Burlew v. Hedgpeth, 448 Fed. Appx. 663 (9
th
 Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Murray, 89 F.2d 459 (7
th
 Cir. 1996); United States v. Boucher, 909 F.2d 1170 (8
th
 Cir. 1990).  
7
 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).  
8
 Id.  
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asserted by the prosecution to successfully rebut the presumption of custody.  It will also address 
the purposes of the presumption as well as the possible benefits and negative consequences of 
implementing this solution into criminal justice practice.  Lastly, this comment will address any 
remaining questions and legal issues left open by this proposal.   
 
Part I: Background  
 To fully examine the legal concepts surrounding Miranda law, one must first identify the 
relevant Constitutional law, the precedent established in Miranda v. Arizona, as well as the cases 
that followed Miranda.  Additionally, one must look to the current federal circuit split on the 
issue of a custody determination in cases where the defendant is questioned in the back of a 
police car and the factual circumstances of these cases. 
A. Relevant Constitutional Law 
The Constitutional law applicable to the Miranda custody analysis includes case law that 
has served to ensure the constitutional guarantees of protection from unreasonable seizures, as 
well as protection against self-incrimination.
9
  These constitutional rights are located in the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution.  
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that, “the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.”10  The definition of seizure is important to this analysis because 
                                                        
9
 See U.S. CONST. am. IV and U.S. CONST. am. V. 
10
 U.S. CONST. am. IV. 
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of its analytical similarities to the determination of custody.
11
  The purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment is “not to eliminate all contact between the police and the citizenry, but ‘to prevent 
arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal 
security of individuals.’”12  The Fourth Amendment seeks to provide a balance between personal 
liberties, as well as the legitimate investigative needs of law enforcement.
13
  Therefore, the 
determination of whether a person has been seized is important to determine whether the proper 
protections were afforded to that individual, specifically by analyzing the reasonableness of that 
seizure.
14
 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that “No person … shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law…”15 The privilege of self-incrimination is important to this 
analysis because the constitutional safeguards established in Miranda v. Arizona were decided in 
order to protect this privilege.
16
  The Miranda warnings ensure when a detained individual is 
questioned, he knows his rights against self-incrimination.
17
  Miranda also extended this Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination to pre-trial matters, finding that it is equally 
important to ensure this right to individuals in police custody as it is to ensure the right to 
individuals during criminal trials.
18
   
 
 
                                                        
11
 Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); with Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984). 
12
 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980) quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543, 554 (1976).  
13
 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980).  
14
 See Id.; U.S. CONST. am IV.  
15
 U.S. CONST. am. V.  
16
 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966). 
17
 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
18
 Id. at 467.  
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B. History of Miranda law 
 Miranda v. Arizona examined whether statements obtained from an individual who is 
subjected to a custodial police interrogation are admissible in court.
19
  The case also examined 
the police procedures necessary to constitutionally safeguard the individual’s privilege against 
self-incrimination.
20
  The Court established that a defendant must be warned before questioning 
that he had the right to remain silent and that anything he says can be used against him in a court 
of law, and that he had the right to the presence of an attorney.
21
  The Court recognized that the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was jeopardized where an individual is 
taken into custody and subjected to questioning.
22
  After the Miranda warnings are read, the 
defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive the rights and agree to answer questions or give 
a statement to the police.
23
  The Court mandated that an individual be informed of their rights 
prior to questioning, due to the inherent coerciveness of a custodial interrogation.
24
   
 Following Miranda, cases sought to both expand and limit the legal principles 
established.  A bright line rule was established that if a person is arrested, he is in custody for the 
purposes of Miranda warnings.
25
  The Supreme Court also held that a person who voluntarily 
accompanied the police, was left unrestrained and was not formally under arrest, was not in 
custody.
26
  In the same case, the Court also held that while “circumstances of each case would 
certainly influence a determination of whether a suspect is ‘in custody’ for purposes of receiving 
Miranda protection” that ultimately, the inquiry is “simply whether there is ‘formal arrest or 
                                                        
19
 Id. at 439.  
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. at 467-468.  
22
 Id. at 467 (citing U.S. CONST. am. V). 
23
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). 
24
 Id. at 469. 
25
 Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).  
26
 California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).  
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restraint on freedom of movement’ of degree associated with arrest.”27  The Court emphasized 
that Miranda warnings are not required “simply because the questioning takes place in a station 
house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.”28 
 Two years following the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda, the Court further defined 
“seizure” in Terry v. Ohio.29  Though the main focus of the Terry decision was to define the 
police procedure of “stop and frisk,” the Court also further defined the circumstances 
surrounding seizure of individuals.
30
  In Terry, it was determined that all seizures of individuals 
do not occur in the traditional context of arrests, and yet such seizures are still governed by the 
Fourth Amendment.
31
  The Court reasoned that, “[i]t must be recognized that whenever a police 
officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that 
person.”32  The police officer seizes an individual when they execute a “show of authority” 
which occurs when an officer “by means of physical force or show of authority has in some way 
restrained the liberty of a citizen.”33  Terry expanded the context of a seizure, and underlined the 
importance of constitutionally safeguarding a restraint on an individual’s liberty.34  
 As the Supreme Court began to further define seizure law, the development of an 
objective test emerged.
35
  In United States v. Mendenhall, the Court stated that “as long as the 
person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there 
has been no intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy.”36  Ultimately, the Court held that a 
                                                        
27
 Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125. 
28
 Id.  
29
 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
30
 Id. at 16. 
31
 Id. at 16. (“It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs seizures of the person which do not eventuate in a 
trip to the station house and prosecution for crime – “arrests” in traditional terminology.”) 
32
 Id. at 16. 
33
 Id. at 19.  
34
 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
35
 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).  
36
 Id. at 553.  
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person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in the view of all 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that she was 
not free to leave.
37
  This standard to determine whether a seizure of an individual has occurred is 
a merging of a totality of the circumstances, and reasonable person standard.
38
   
Ultimately, both the analysis for seizure under the Fourth Amendment and the analysis 
for a custody determination for Miranda rights look to the beliefs of a reasonable person, totality 
of the circumstances and the belief of freedom of movement.   
C.  Definition of Custody 
The cases described above are just a few of the many in which the courts have defined, 
expanded or limited the definitions of seizure and custody.
39
  As it currently stands, the legal test 
for determining a seizure and custody are almost identical.  However, the concept of a seizure 
refers to the jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment, which protects people from unreasonable 
searches and seizures by state actors.
40
  The concept of “custody” is important in determining if a 
custodial interrogation exists, where the individual must be read their Miranda rights in order to 
protect the privilege against self-incrimination.
41
  While different legal concepts, the test for 
both, as established by the Supreme Court, is a totality of the circumstances analysis that seeks to 
determine whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave or terminate the police 
interaction.
42
  Therefore, if a person has been found to be in police custody for purposes of 
Miranda, it follows that a seizure of that person has also occurred.  However, the courts are not 
clear on whether a seizure of that individual would be the equivalent of that person also being 
                                                        
37
 Id. at 554.  
38
 Id. 
39
 See supra notes 19-38.  
40
 U.S. CONST. am. IV.  
41
 See U.S. CONST. am. V.; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).   
42
 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
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considered in police custody.  One reason for this inequality between a “custody” determination 
and a “seizure” determination is because the legal test is a totality of the circumstances analysis, 
which allows a court to consider certain factors more heavily than others, depending on the facts 
of the case and that case’s potential outcome.43  However, while the factual analysis or outcomes 
may be different between the two legal concepts, the legal test remains the same.
44
  Because of 
the similarities of the two legal tests, this comment suggests that when a person is seized under 
the 4
th
 Amendment in the back of a police car, the Court should consider that person to be “in 
custody” for purposes of the 5th Amendment.45  
D. Federal Circuit Split 
 Currently, there is a federal circuit split on the issue of whether, when questioning an 
individual in the back of a police car, the individual is considered to be “in custody” to require a 
reading of Miranda rights.
46
  Circuit courts define this issue in different ways.  Some circuits 
focus on the definition of seizure under the Fourth Amendment, while others focus on the legal 
concept of “in custody.”  Either way, the circuits are split on whether, when in the back of a 
police car, a reasonable person would feel they were free to leave the situation.  
 The Ninth Circuit is the most recent circuit to decide this issue.
47
  Burlew v. Hedgpeth 
held that the defendant was not in custody at the time he made his incriminating statement.
48
  At 
the time, Burlew was sitting in the back of the patrol car, but he was not handcuffed and was not 
                                                        
43
 See Id.  
44
 See Id. 
45
 See U.S. CONST. am. IV; U.S. CONST. AM V.; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). (Also note, that this logic 
would also apply conversely, where a person is considered to be “in custody” the court could also undergo an 
analysis as to whether or not the seizure of that individual was unreasonable under the 4
th
 Amendment, though this 
exceeds the scope of this comment.) 
46
 See supra note 4. 
47
 Burlew v. Hedgpeth, 443 Fed. Appx. 663 (9
th
 Cir. 2011).  
48
 Id. at 664. 
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told he was under arrest.
49
  Based on these facts, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant was 
not in custody.  In its decision, the Ninth Circuit recognized the circuit split that existed on this 
issue.  In a previous case, the Ninth Circuit held that an individual in the back of a police car was 
in custody.
50
  In United States v. Henley, an FBI agent questioned the defendant while the 
defendant was handcuffed in the back of the police car.
51
  However, the defendant was not 
formally placed under arrest.
52
  The factual difference between the defendant in Burlew and the 
defendant in Henley is that the defendant in Henley was handcuffed while seated in the car.
53
  In 
Henley, the Ninth Circuit found the defendant was in custody.  Thus, it is clear that the Ninth 
Circuit placed a strong emphasis on the factor of whether the individual is handcuffed in making 
custody determinations.
54
  Thus, whether or not a suspect has been handcuffed while sitting in 
the back of a police car may be a factual circumstance of a case that serves to rebut the proposed 
presumption of custody.
55
   
 The Fourth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit both found that a defendant was “in custody” in 
cases where incriminating statements were made in the back of a police car.  In Figg v. Shroeder, 
the Fourth Circuit held that the defendant was seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment because it was an undisputed fact of that case that he was not allowed to leave, 
despite not being formally arrested in the back of the car.
56
  The Fourth Circuit reasoned that in 
the absence of a formal arrest, the trial court should look to whether a seizure occurred in order 
                                                        
49
 Id. 
50
 United States v. Henley, 984 F. 2d 1040 (9
th
 Cir. 1992).  
51
 Henley, 984 U.S. at 1042. 
52
 Henley, 984 U.S. at 1042. 
53
 Id. 
54
 Compare Burlew v. Hedgpeth, 443 Fed. Appx. 663, 664 (9
th
 Cir. 2011) to United States v. Henley, 984 F. 2d 
1040, 1042 (9
th
 Cir. 1992).  
55
 See Part II: Analysis; Factors that Rebut the Presumption. 
56
 Figg v. Shroeder, 321 F.3d 625 (4
th
 Cir. 2002).  
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to determine if the individual was informally arrested.
57
  The court found it dispositive that the 
individual would not have been allowed to leave the patrol car in which he was detained, thus he 
was subjected to a Fourth Amendment seizure.
58
  The court did, however, ultimately conclude 
that these seizures did not violate the Constitution.
59
   
The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Richardson, also found that the individual, while in 
the back of the police car, had been seized under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
60
 The 
court enumerated factors that may lead a reasonable person to conclude they were not free to 
leave.
61
  These factors included the threatening presence of several officers, physical touching of 
the person of the citizen, an officer displaying a weapon, or the use of language or tone of voice 
indicating that compliance with the officer’s request is not optional.62  The court also cited Terry 
v. Ohio, stating that a seizure of a person will occur when the officer “by means of physical force 
or show of authority has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.”63  In this case, four 
officers approached the defendant and informed him that he was a subject of a drug 
investigation.
64
  When the officers asked for consent to search, the defendant refused.
65
  As a 
result of his refusal to consent, he was placed in the back the police car.
66
  Similar to the facts of 
Figg, the defendant here was also not formally arrested, but the court found it was reasonable for 
him to believe he was not permitted to leave.
67
  The court reasoned that if, “after refusing to 
consent to a search, a person was placed in the back of a police car by “agents” who had no 
                                                        
57
 Id. at 636. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. 
60
 United States v. Richardson, 949 F.2d 851 (6
th
 Cir. 1991).  
61
 Richardson, 949 F.2d at 856.  
62
 Id. quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).   
63
 Id. quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). 
64
 Richardson, 949 F.2d at 856.  
65
 Id. 
66
 Id. 
67
 Id. at 856; See Figg v. Shroeder, 321 F.3d 625 (4
th
 Cir. 2002). 
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intention of allowing him to leave, that person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave.”68 Thus, the Sixth Circuit found a seizure of the individual occurred.69 
These cases uphold the Miranda law effectively and better protect the privilege against 
self-incrimination established in the Fifth Amendment.
70
   However, other circuits have not been 
as amenable to the protection against self incrimination, thus creating the federal circuit split at 
issue.
71
   
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits came to the same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit in its 
decision in Burlew, finding that the defendants were not in custody when they were questioned in 
the back of a police car.
72
  The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Murray, held that evidence 
seized from the lawful traffic stop of the defendant and his self incriminating statement about 
possessing the gun found in the car, were properly admitted.
73
  The defendant was placed in the 
squad car after the officers discovered crack cocaine in the car.
74
  Upon further search, the 
officers also discovered a firearm.
75
  The officer opened the door of the squad car, and while 
holding the gun, asked the defendant if he knew who owned it.
76
  The defendant stated that he 
did not know who owned the gun, but that he did own the car.
77
 The court reasoned that the 
defendant was not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda warnings because there was no 
evidence in the record to support that his freedom of movement was restrained.
78
  Other factors 
the court considered was that only a brief period of time elapsed between the initial stop and the 
                                                        
68
 Richardson, 949 F.2d at 855.  
69
 Id. 
70
 See United States v. Richardson, 949 F.2d 851 (6
th
 Cir. 1991); United States v. Henley, 984 F. 2d 1040, 1042 (9
th
 
Cir. 1992); Figg v. Shroeder, 321 F.3d 625 (4
th
 Cir. 2002). 
71
 See United States v. Boucher, 909 F.2d 1170 (8
th
 Cir. 1990); United States v. Murray, 89 F.2d 459 (7
th
 Cir. 1996). 
72
 See Id.  
73
 United States v. Murray, 89 F.2d 459 (7
th
 Cir. 1996).  
74
 Id. at 462. 
75
 Id. at 461. 
76
 Id. 
77
 Id. 
78
 Id. at 462. 
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time of the questioning, nor was there any evidence that the officers engaged in conduct that 
overcame the will of the defendant.
79
  Despite the court deeming the most relevant inquiry to be 
how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood the situation, the court 
held that the defendant was not in custody.
80
 
 The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Boucher, found that a reasonable person in 
Boucher’s position would not have considered the officer’s questions in the patrol car to be a 
“custodial interrogation.”81  In Boucher, the defendant claimed that his statements were illegally 
obtained because he was not given Miranda warnings and the items found in the subsequent 
search were fruits of an unconstitutional custodial interrogation.
82
  The court did not agree with 
the defendant’s position.83  Rather, the court found that the questioning of the defendant could 
not be considered an interrogation because the defendant did not know that the officer had 
spotted a gun lodged between his seat, thus the defendant was unaware that he could incriminate 
himself.
84
  On the issue of custody, the court found that the defendant was not in custody simply 
because the questioning is conducted in a certain place, like a police car.
85
  The court reasoned 
that placing an emphasis on the location of the questioning was improper in making a custody 
determination.
86
  The court held that a “reasonable person in Boucher’s position would not have 
considered [the police officer’s] questions in the patrol car a custodial interrogation.87 
 The solution proposed in this comment, which would create a presumption of custody 
when a defendant is questioned in the back of a police car, is contrary to the decisions of the 
                                                        
79
 Murray, 88 F.2d at 462.  
80
 Id.  
81
 United States v. Boucher, 909 F.2d 1170 (8
th
 Cir. 1990).  
82
 Id. at 1173. 
83
 Id. at 1174. 
84
 Id.  
85
 Id.  
86
 Id.  
87
 United States v. Boucher, 909 F.2d 1170, 1174 (8
th
 Cir. 1990). 
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Seventh and Eighth Circuits.  The solution proposed here suggests that if this issue were to ever 
reach the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court should consider the decisions of the 
Fourth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits as having decided these issues in accordance with the legal tests 
already established by the Supreme Court in previous cases.   
Part II: Analysis 
A. Creation of Rebuttable Presumption 
As previously stated, the laws surrounding seizure and custody determinations are 
essentially analyzed under the same legal standard.
88
  Therefore, where a seizure occurs, the 
courts should consider that individual to be “in custody.”89  Miranda rights were created in order 
to guard against the inherently coercive environment of a custodial interrogation.
90
  This inherent 
coercion was originally developed in the context of a police station questioning, however, now, 
“custody” is no longer defined as the traditional concept of being arrested and or being held in 
the police station.
91
  One of these contexts that should be considered inherently coercive is when 
the defendant is seized in the back of a police car.  
 Currently, the standard that exists for a custody determination is a reasonable person 
standard based on the totality of the circumstances that asks the question of whether that 
reasonable person would feel free to leave or terminate the interaction with the police.
92
  This 
standard should be altered to create a presumption that if the defendant is interrogated while in 
the back of a police car, there has been a seizure of that person, and further that person was “in 
custody.”93  Because of the inherent coercion that exists in that location, the court should assume 
                                                        
88
 See supra notes 39-45. 
89
 See U.S. CONST. am. IV; U.S. CONST. am V.; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
90
 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966). 
91
 See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983). 
92
 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
93
 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966). 
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that the reasonable individual would not feel free to leave.
94
  As a result of this inherent coercion 
and subsequent custody determination, the presumption would dictate that that individual must 
be provided with Miranda warnings when interrogated in the back of a police car.
95
  The burden 
would be on the prosecution to rebut this presumption.  In order to rebut the presumption, the 
prosecution must allege facts on the record that establish that the individual did have freedom of 
movement, thus rendering the defendant not in custody, and Miranda warnings unnecessary.
96
  
B. Purpose of the Presumption 
 Often cases with Miranda legal issues are in court because the defendant is asserting that 
a statement he or she made should be inadmissible because the defendant was not aware of his or 
her Miranda rights when he or she made the incriminating statement.  On the other side, the 
prosecution is asserting that the person was not in custody, and thus the police were not required 
to read the defendant his or her Miranda rights.  The legal standards exist for the purpose of 
providing judges a way to answer this question.  These standards are vital to the legal system,  
and while they will always be imperfect and have weaknesses, it is important to try and account 
for as many facts and circumstances as possible.  
 When determining legal tests in this area of the law, it is important for courts to balance 
the need for effective law enforcement and the rights of American citizens.
97
 “The purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact between the police and the citizenry, but to 
                                                        
94
 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
95
 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-468 (1966).  
96
 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (for reasonable person standard and totality of the 
circumstances analysis being adopted here). 
97
 Christopher Lynch, Comment, Here in My Car: The Crossing of Miranda and Terry at the Intersection of Custody 
During Stops 25 J. Civ. Rts. & Econ. Dev. 909 (2011).  
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prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and 
personal security of all individuals.”98 
One underlying purpose of the Miranda law was to alert the public when their rights are 
being violated or are in danger of being violated.
99
  The creation of this presumption will 
preserve the Supreme Court’s underlying aim established in Miranda.100  It produces a workable 
legal standard that will allow members of the public to know when they are actually in custody 
and when they are free to exercise their right against self-incrimination.
101
  The current standard 
of a totality of the circumstances analysis does not allow for this clarity.  More importantly, the 
proposed presumption will protect the individual even in the event that they are not made aware 
of their rights.
102
  
C. Inherently Coercive Environment Determination  
The purpose of the Miranda law is to provide constitutional safeguards in inherently 
coercive police dominated situations.
103
  In order for the privilege of self-incrimination to be 
effective, it also has to apply before trial.
104
  Otherwise, the police could circumvent the privilege 
it by interrogating as suspect beforehand, and then using that prior statement against the 
individual at trial.
105
  Therefore, the Court determined that without procedural safeguards, police 
interrogation is inherently coercive due to “inherently compelling pressures which work to 
undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not 
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otherwise due so freely.”106  Therefore, the Court does not need to inquire into the facts of the 
given case.
107
  Because custodial interrogations are considered inherently coercive, as long as the 
individual was interrogated in custody, the Court will presume that statements made by the 
individual were influenced by that coercion.
108
  
Miranda also outlines the details of the coercive police tactics that led the Court to 
determine the need for procedural safeguards.
109
  For example, the Court in Miranda recognized 
that many police manuals detail methods for intimidating defendants into providing 
incriminating information.
110
  For example, Miranda cites one police handbook that states, 
If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in the 
investigator's office or at least in a room of his own choice. The 
subject should be deprived of every psychological advantage. In 
his own home he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is 
more keenly aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his 
indiscretions or criminal behavior within the walls of his home. 
Moreover his family and other friends are nearby, their presence 
lending moral support. In his own office, the investigator possesses 
all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the 
forces of the law.
111
 
 
The Court found it was clear that the aim of these police tactics was to isolate the individual, thus 
depriving him of “outside support.”112  The Court noted that, “when normal procedures fail to 
produce the needed result, the police may resort to deceptive stratagems such as giving false 
legal advice. It is important to keep the subject off balance, for example, by trading on his 
insecurity about himself or his surroundings. The police then persuade, trick, or cajole him out of 
exercising his constitutional rights.”113  Thus, in Miranda the Court chose to concern itself with 
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the “evils” that police interrogation procedures could bring.114  The likelihood of coercion is the 
policy reason for the creation of the procedural safeguards that are now referred to as an 
individual’s “Miranda rights.”115  These constitutional rights include the right to remain silent, 
that anything you say can be used against you in the court of law, the right to counsel and that if 
one is unable to afford an attorney, that the court will appoint an attorney.
116
  
Ultimately, in Miranda, by creating a presumption that being interrogated by the police in 
custody is inherently coercive, the Court places the burden on the police to show that they made 
the person aware of their rights.
117
  Without such a showing, it would be very difficult for the 
police to use any subsequent statements at trial.
118
  These same factors of inherent coercion the 
Miranda court found applied to police stations can also be applied to the environment of a police 
car.  
This solution does place emphasis on a factor that has previously not been considered 
dispositive in the Miranda analysis.
119
  This solution will put the emphasis on the inherently 
coercive nature of the environment of the back of the police car.
120
  Based on the established 
legal test, the place where an interrogation occurs does not conclusively establish the presence or 
absence of custody.
121
  
 Previous cases have held that a non-custodial situation does not become a custodial 
interrogation because a court concludes that the questioning took place in a “coercive 
environment” in the absence of a formal arrest or restraint on the freedom of movement.122  The 
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Court has also determined that questioning that took place in a prison, without more factors of 
coercion, was not enough to constitute custody under the meaning of Miranda.
123
  The Court has 
never found that a coercive environment was dispositive to determine that the person was “in 
custody” for the purposes of Miranda.124  This proposed solution alters these previous holdings 
by asserting that some environments should be considered so coercive as to create a presumption 
of custody.  
Originally, the context of Miranda focused on interrogations that occurred in a police 
station.
125
  This context must be expanded to adapt to the current problems facing law 
enforcement and the citizenry’s knowledge, or lack of knowledge, of their constitutional rights.  
Questionings that take place in the back of a police car can be compared to the traditional 
scenario of a defendant being questioned in a police station.
126
  Both are police dominated 
atmospheres that are associated with formal arrest.  
Additionally, there are certain factors surrounding a questioning in a police car that also 
contribute to the inherent coerciveness of the environment.  A reasonable person may find that 
questioning in the back of a police car even more inherently coercive than the environment of a 
police station.
127
  For example, an individual would have less freedom of movement in the back 
of a car than in a holding room at a police station, especially if the police car is moving and 
transporting them to a destination.
128
  The fact that the car is capable of movement contributes 
strongly to a reasonable person’s opinion that they would not be free to leave.   
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Secondly, most police cars lack handles or any way in which an individual would be able 
to physically exit the vehicle once the door was shut. This factor, or even an individual’s 
knowledge of that fact, renders a police car a more intimidating environment for interrogation. 
There is also a power dynamic associated with the front seat and the back seat of 
vehicles.  Those in the front seat, or the driver’s seat, are in control of the vehicle.  Those who 
are seated in the backseat are subordinate to that driver and their control of that vehicle.  This 
power dynamic exists outside of the presence of a police officer, and enhances the perceived 
power of the vehicle’s driver.  Add a police presence to this scenario, and that power dynamic 
becomes even more extreme.  
Additionally, general public knowledge associates being placed into the back of a police 
car with being under arrest.  The media and other news outlets, as well as mainstream television 
and movies, often depict individuals under arrest being placed into the back of police cars.  Often 
in such scenes, the individual being placed in the back of the police car is read his Miranda 
rights simultaneously.  Depictions of crime and arrests on television and in the movies contribute 
to a reasonable person’s expectations of “arrest” and the legal concept of when one is considered 
“in custody.”  There is also a strong public stigma against people who are arrests and those who 
are in custody.
129
  Often those who are in custody can experience isolation, loss of jobs, 
dislocation, family distress and loss of self-respect.
130
  And when the legal test for a custody 
determination is whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave, these outside factors 
toward arrests that contribute to how a reasonable person perceives a situation are relevant to that 
determination. 
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The Supreme Court has also engaged in discussions about the inherently fearful nature of 
police presence, even to an innocent individual.
131
  In his dissent in Illinois v. Wardlow, Justice 
Stevens posits that flight to escape police detection may have “entirely innocent motivation.”132  
Justice Stevens disagrees with the majority that concluded that when the individual in question 
fled from the police officer, it provided the officer with reasonable suspicion that allowed the 
police officer to legally seize the individual.
133
  A “reasonable person” may conclude that an 
officer’s presence indicates that there is criminal activity in the vicinity nearby, and that there is 
a substantial element of danger associated with that criminal activity.
134
  Stevens concludes that 
“[t]hese considerations can lead to an innocent and undesirable desire to quit the vicinity with all 
speed.”135  Additionally, an entirely innocent individual may seek to leave the scene in fear of 
being apprehended as a guilty party, or from an unwillingness to appear in court as a witness to a 
crime.
136
  Justice Steven’s dicta in Wardlow provides context for an important aspect of this 
presumption.  A police presence can be fearful for individuals, whether they are innocent or 
guilty.
137
  This presence becomes more intimidating when the police begin to question an 
individual.
138
  Thus, police presence combined with interrogation results in a situation that is 
often coercive in nature.
139
  This coercion is particularly present when there is a show of 
authority involved, such as when the individual is placed into that officer’s official police 
vehicle. 
140
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As criminal law develops, it is clear that Miranda warnings should not solely be required 
in the context of a police station interrogation.  The courts should progress and recognize that 
inherently coercive situations exist outside that traditional context.  This presumption allows for 
recognition of how a reasonable person perceives a situation when they are placed in the back of 
a police car by establishing a presumption of custody in such situations. 
E. Rebutting the Presumption 
 Additional factors of the detention, or the lack of the existence of certain factors, may 
serve to assist the prosecution in rebutting the established presumption of custody.  These 
factors, examined by other courts in making custodial determinations, are very important to the 
analysis.  The “totality of the circumstances” test is based solely on the facts present on the 
record.
141
  In light of the created presumption of custody here, the facts that form the totality of 
the circumstances will now assist the prosecution in rebutting the presumption.
142
  
 The Supreme Court has identified some factors that would contribute to a reasonable 
person not feeling free to leave a situation or terminate a police interaction.
143
  Those factors 
include the threatening presence of several officers, physical touching of the person of the 
citizen, an officer displaying a weapon, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that 
compliance with the officer’s request is not optional.144  These factors, under the new 
presumption of custody, are factors that would result in the court upholding the determination of 
custody.
145
  Additionally, contrary factors or the lack of these factors could be used to assist the 
prosecution in rebutting the presumption.
146
  For example, if the officer did not display a 
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weapon, did not touch the individual, or if there was only one officer on the scene, under the 
precedent of Mendenhall, the prosecution could argue the individual was not “in custody” for 
purposes of Miranda rights.
147
  
 Another relevant factual consideration is whether the defendant was handcuffed.  If the 
defendant was not handcuffed, that factor would support the prosecution’s assertion that the 
individual had freedom of movement and was not seized during the police interaction.
148
  In 
some cases where the defendant was handcuffed, the Court found that the individual was in 
custody.
149
  For example, in Henley, one factor that led the court to determine that the individual 
was in custody was the fact that he was handcuffed while seated in the police car.
150
  Similarly, 
in Burlew, when the defendant was not handcuffed, the Court rejected the argument that the 
defendant was in custody.
151
  In some cases where there are other demonstrations of authority 
present, the use of handcuffs may not be a dispositive factor.
152
  For example: 
Under the totality of the circumstances approach now used by 
courts, it is very likely that the court would find that when a person 
is involuntarily removed from his home, especially in the middle 
of the night, and taken in the police car down to the station, that he 
was definitely in custody for Miranda purposes.’  This would hold 
true even where the police don’t handcuff the suspect.  Police 
officers who wish to question ‘the usual suspects’ should make it 
very clear to them if they are not under arrest that they do not have 
to accompany the police and are free to leave the station at any 
time.
153
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The second factor is whether or not the defendant was formally arrested.
154
  If the 
defendant had not been formally arrested, it would help the prosecution in rebutting the 
presumption of custody.
155
  In Figg, the defendant was not formally arrested when he was placed 
in the car, but he was still considered seized within the definition of the Fourth Amendment.
156
  
In Richardson, the defendant was not formally arrested, but was seized because it was made 
clear to him that he was not free to leave.
157
  Ultimately, if an individual has been informed that 
he is officially under arrest, this should support a finding of custody based on the purposes and 
principles underlying Miranda.
158
 Being officially under arrest would rise to the level of custody 
described in Beheler, where the Court found that an individual is “in custody” when the police 
encounter rises to the degree associated with a formal arrest.
159
  
 A third factor that the court may consider in the prosecution’s attempts to rebut the 
presumption, is whether the defendant was directly told that he could not move.
160
  If the 
defendant is never told that he or she could not move, it may help to rebut the presumption.
161
  
On the contrary, if they are specifically told they cannot move during the course of the police 
interaction, then clearly at this point their movement is restricted and they should be considered 
seized.
162
  Thus, the presumption would stand if a person were told they were not free to leave 
the police encounter.
163
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Some state cases have also focused on a defendant’s proximity to a police car, even when 
the individual was not physically detained inside the police car.
164
  For example, in People v. 
Kennedy, the defendant was asked to step to the rear of a patrol car and was patted down.
165
  The 
court determined that the officers had demonstrated sufficient control of the defendant’s physical 
movement to warrant a reasonable belief on his part that he was not free to leave.
166
  Similarly, 
where a defendant was drifting in and out of consciousness, was removed from his home and 
propped up against the police car, the court held that the questioning throughout the interaction 
constituted a custodial interrogation.
167
  The South Carolina Court of Appeals reasoned that 
where the individual was physically removed from his home and carried to the police car and 
handcuffed, it was clear that the police had taken that person into custody.
168
  Other courts 
however, have taken a more strict approach.
169
  An Ohio District Court found that the suspect 
was not in custody even when he was spread-eagled against a police car and patted down during 
an investigatory stop.
170
  The court reasoned that requiring the suspect to place his hands on the 
patrol car was reasonable given the officer’s belief that the individual was armed, and reasonable 
force would not constitute the police officer’s actions rising the level of a custodial 
interrogation.
171
   
 Some courts have also differentiated between placing the defendant in the front of the 
police vehicle, versus in the back seat of the police vehicle.
172
  This raises the question of 
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whether the prosecution would be able to argue that the front seat of a police vehicle is a less 
coercive environment than the back seat of a police vehicle, which symbolizes a much more 
traditional aspect of arrest. 
 Ultimately, these factual considerations are just some examples of the types of facts a 
case may present that can assist a prosecutor in attempting to rebut the proposed presumption.  
F. Interrogation Analysis 
The proposed solution here focuses on the Fifth Amendment analysis in order to 
determine whether a person should have been read their Miranda rights.  In such an analysis, 
first the court must determine if the person was “in custody” for purposes of Miranda, then the 
court must determine if the police engaged in an “interrogation” of the suspect.173  The 
presumption proposed here focuses less on whether the police are “interrogating” the suspect, 
and more on whether that person has been seized to the point of being considered “in custody.”  
However, whether the officer was intending to get an incriminating response is a factor that goes 
to the “interrogation” aspect of the custody determination.174   
The Supreme Court in R.I. v. Innis stated, “that is to say, the term ‘interrogation’ under 
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of 
the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know 
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”175  This definition 
focuses on what is perceived by the suspect, not what the police intend in their questioning.
176
   
The interrogation analysis is relevant to the proposed solution because some courts have 
failed to find that a defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation in or around a police car 
                                                        
173
 Id. 
174
 R.I. v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 380 (1980). 
175
 Id. 
176
 Id. 
 26 
not because the environment did not render the individual seized, but rather because the 
questions asked by the police officers did not amount to the level of an “interrogation.”177  For 
example, in People v. Fulcher, the court found that the officer did not question the subject in an 
effort to illicit an incriminating response, even though the defendant was temporarily detained 
outside the police vehicle.
178
  Ultimately, even if the court determines that the individual was in 
custody due to the presumption suggested here or otherwise, the second prong of the Miranda 
legal standard must be met.
179
  The defense must also show that an interrogation occurred, 
because the custody determination will not require a reading of Miranda rights.
180
 
 
G. Applicable Miranda Exceptions 
 It should be noted that the Supreme Court found that Terry stops did not require Miranda 
warnings and did not rise to the level of a custodial interrogation.
181
  As a result, many courts 
have determined that Terry detainees are not in Miranda custody.
182
  Factors relevant to this 
decision include the brief period of time an individual is usually detained during a Terry stop, as 
well as a typically less intimidating police presence.
183
  In Berkemer v. McCarty, the Court held 
that a traditional Terry stop of a vehicle did not render the person “in custody.”184  The Court 
concluded the individual was not in custody because “the respondent…failed to demonstrate 
that, at any time between the initial stop and arrest, he was subjected to restraints comparable to 
those associated with formal arrest.” 185   The Court considered the fact that the interaction 
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occurred over a short period of time, and that the individual was not told at any time that the 
detention would not be temporary.
186
  There was one police officer asking a few questions and he 
only requested that the respondent perform a balancing test.
187
  The Court held that, “treatment 
of this sort cannot fairly be characterized as the functional equivalent of formal arrest.” 188  
Therefore in the event that a motor vehicle or a Terry stop involve the placing of an individual in 
the back of the police car, it is possible the Court would extend the Berkemer holding to that 
case, thus serving to rebut the presumption that the individual was placed in custody. 
However, the Terry stop exclusion to Miranda created in Berkemer does not eliminate the 
presumption proposed in this comment.
189
  The analysis should occur in all circumstances where 
a person is asked questions while sitting in the back of the police car.
190
  Even Berkemer states 
that once formally arrested, the individual must be read Miranda rights.
191
  Therefore, if the court 
finds that the individual, when detained in the car, was subjected to the same restraint of 
movement as a formal arrest, and the prosecution is unable to rebut the presumption than the 
presumption of custody will stand.
192
  However, if the questioning occurs in the context of a 
Terry stop, the court may consider this as a factor in the prosecution rebutting the presumption, 
though it should not be dispositive.
193
  
It should also be noted that already established exceptions to the Miranda rule will also 
serve as exceptions to this presumption of custody.  For example, the public safety exception 
created in New York v. Quarles, will limit the presumption.
194
  In Quarles, the police frisked a 
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subject inside a grocery store after a woman reported that he had raped her.  When the police 
realized he had an empty shoulder harness, they asked him where he hid the gun prior to reading 
him Miranda warnings.
195
  The defendant was also handcuffed at the time of the questioning.
196
  
However, the Supreme Court held that his statements were admissible despite the lack of 
Miranda warnings by establishing a public safety exception to Miranda v. Arizona.
197
  The Court 
held that, if it would be reasonable for the police officer to be concerned about public safety, the 
police can questions without first giving Miranda warnings.
198
  Additionally, the answers to 
those questions can be admitted into evidence.
199  
Additionally, providing Miranda rights will likely not remedy the Fourth Amendment 
violation of an illegal detention.
200
  In Dunaway v. New York, the police questioned the informant 
and read him his Miranda rights at the police station, but did not have enough information to get 
a warrant for the defendant’s arrest.201  The Court held that while proper Miranda warnings were 
given and the petitioner’s statements were “voluntary,” they were inadmissible because the 
petitioner’s confession occurred during his illegal detention.202  “Detention for custodial 
interrogation, regardless of its label, intrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment as necessary to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest.”203  
Additionally, “Miranda warnings and the exclusion of a confession made without them, do not 
alone sufficiently deter a Fourth Amendment violation.”204  Therefore, even with the proposed 
presumption in effect, if the police presence is illegal or the undermining stop or arrest is invalid 
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under the Fourth Amendment, then the presumption would likely not be rebuttable by the 
prosecution in light of defense facts asserting the illegal detention.  
H. Ramifications and Limitations to the Presumption 
 The proposed solution of creating the rebuttable presumption has potential benefits as 
well as possible detriments to the mission of law enforcement.  The solution is likely to be 
characterized as serving or protecting the rights of defendants, as it serves to counter balance the 
inherently coercive nature of detention in the back of a police car.
205
  However, it could also be 
considered pro-prosecution because it will ensure that any statements made by the defendant will 
be admissible in court, or in the very least, ensure that the defendant’s statements are not 
excluded because he was not read Miranda warnings prior to the statement being made.
206
  It is 
also possible that establishing this presumption will result in a more efficient motion practice 
system, and decrease the amount of motions to suppress statements on the grounds that the 
defendant was not read his Miranda rights.
207
  
 On the contrary however, if this presumption were to become law, police officers may 
hesitate to place defendants in the back of police cars simply to control them, or the situation.
208
 
Another possible consequence is that the police may err on the side of caution and handcuff the 
defendants less frequently, especially if handcuffing a defendant is a factor that the court finds 
rebuts the presumption.
209
  If handcuffing the defendant or placing them in the back of the police 
car means that they must read the individual their Miranda rights, they may hesitate to detain 
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that person in that manner.
210
 These effects could lead to endangering the police officers or even 
the general public in the surrounding area.
211
   
 The goal of the presumption is to promote the reading of Miranda rights to individuals 
who are being detained in coercive environments.
212
  The presumption aims to accomplish this 
goal by placing the finder of fact in the defendant’s shoes prior to assessing the reasonableness of 
police actions.  However, there are concerns associated with changing the current objective 
standard to one with more subjectivity.  Such concerns include whether the defendant would be 
required to testify as to what he or she actually felt during the time of the interrogation.  
Currently, the objective nature of the standard allows a court to make that determination much 
more efficiently and without such testimony.  This shift in the standard may impact judicial 
efficiency.  
I. Public Opinion  
 In furtherance of the concepts explained throughout this comment, a survey was 
conducted of average Americans on their views of policing and the concepts of arrest and 
Miranda rights.
213
  The survey was responded to by seventy five individuals, 51% of whom had a 
legal education background
214
, and 12% of whom had been arrested. Of the respondents, 77% of 
them were between the ages of twenty three and twenty nine.  The largest group of respondents 
that responded were age twenty four, with twenty respondents and age twenty five, with fifteen 
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respondents.  12% of respondents were between the ages of thirty and forty nine, and 11% were 
age fifty and over. 
 The survey asked the respondents three questions on their feelings about terminating a 
police encounters. When asked, “If you were stopped by a police officer and questioned about 
your name and whereabouts, would you feel free to walk away from them without answering 
their questions?” 88% of the respondents answered that no, they would not feel free to walk 
away without speaking the officer.  Similarly, 78% of the respondents said they would not feel 
free to terminate a police encounter if the officer asked them to sit in the back of their squad car, 
even if they were not handcuffed.  If they were handcuffed, however, 87% of the respondents 
would assume they were under arrest, even if they were not told they were formally under arrest.  
Of the 75 respondents, the vast majority (81%)
215
 wrote that an individual should be read their 
Miranda rights when they are arrested.  This would mean that the overlapping group would 
assume that Miranda rights should be read upon being handcuffed by the police, since the 
majority of the respondents associated that action with formal arrest.  
 The survey also inquired about coercive environments. When asked, “Where would you 
feel more intimidated if you were being questioned by the police in one of the following 
locations?” The options were police station, police car, your home and roadside.  64% of the 
respondents answered that the police station was the most intimidating environment for 
questioning, while 26% responded that a police car was the most intimidating place.  One 
respondent who answered police car stated, “It’s probably a bad situation to be in a police car. At 
least in a police station it’s a larger building and there is a possibility of being free to walk 
around so long as you’re not restrained. It’s a much tighter situation in a police car and for some 
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reason seems more intimidating.”216 Other respondents who chose the same answer, referencing 
the limited space of a police car, the fact that the doors can not be opened from the inside, and 
the lack of other people present.  Another respondent stated that there is likely to be more 
supervision of the officers and cameras protecting their civil liberties at a police station than in a 
squad car.
217
  “If I were placed in a squad car it would signal to me that I am in an intimidating 
situation” was the response of another survey taker.218 
 These concerns associated with the police car environment, as well as the perceived 
inability to terminate police encounters when the law states that an individual is hypothetically 
legally allowed to do so, show the public confusion over the standards that surround Fourth 
Amendment rights and police activity.  By creating a presumption that an individual is in custody 
during an intimidating encounter with the police in a squad car, the court’s established standard 
would become more synonymous with the expectations of the general public.  
J. Social Science Concerns 
 Many issues that remain unanswered in regards to the topic of Miranda rights, arrests and 
custodial interrogations are concerns of social science.  The entire premise of this presumption 
asks what is reasonable in policing and the enforcement of Fourth Amendment principles.  What 
is considered reasonable may vary depending on the community and it’s level of crime, the 
norms followed by police officers and courts, and the viewpoints of community members.  
Social scientists have begun to examine these issues in the context of stop and frisk, community 
policing and judgments about detaining individuals.
219
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 For example, some social scientists posit that “individuals have implicit (nonconscious) 
biases that can perniciously affect the perceptions, judgments and behaviors that are integral to 
core Fourth Amendment principles.”220  In her scholarly articles, L. Song Richardson also 
astutely notes that Fourth Amendment Scholars are particularly absent from the discussion of 
behavioral science as it relates to Fourth Amendment and policing concerns.
221
  How individuals 
react to police activity, and how the police view the individual’s behavior toward them, is 
extremely relevant to the perceived “reasonableness” of one’s detention or seizure in a police 
dominated atmosphere.
222
  These social science principles are particularly relevant to the creation 
of this presumption, as it assumes an inherently coercive environment for the purposes of a new 
legal standard.   
In her articles, L. Song Richardson also discusses implicit biases in behavior in regards to 
police activity, particularly how that science of implicit social cognition can contribute to the 
understanding of police activities, especially as it relates to the treatment of nonwhites.
223
  
Ultimately, “Negative stereotypes and unfavorable attitudes toward blacks can cause individuals 
to treat them differently than non-stereotyped group members.”224  This concept is particularly 
relevant in certain communities with a high minority population.  In such communities, the 
concept of what is “reasonable” for an individual to believe in the presence of police activity 
could vary from what is considered reasonable in communities that are comprised of mostly 
white individuals.  Yet, our current legal jurisprudence does not in any way account for the make 
up of individual communities as it relates to police presence and action.   
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Ultimately, legal scholars should work to closely consider the social behavioral aspects of 
Fourth Amendment enforcement and how that affects the legal standard and subsequent 
outcomes for individuals, specifically in minority communities.  Currently, however, a 
reasonable person legal standard fails to consider these concerns, thus further supporting a 
restructuring of the Miranda reasonable person analysis, as proposed in this comment.   
Conclusion 
 The solution proposed in this comment, a rebuttable presumption of custody when a 
suspect is interrogated in the back of a police car, seeks to counterbalance the inherently coercive 
nature of a police encounter that occurs in a police car.  While location has not been a previous 
dispositive factor for a custody determination, the courts must recognize the inherently coercive 
nature of such a location by moving away from the traditional context of custodial interrogations 
in police stations.  The creation of this presumption grants defendants the benefit of knowing 
their rights during an inherently coercive situation, a right that Miranda v. Arizona sought to 
afford all defendants that found themselves in a custodial interrogation.  The totality of the 
circumstances analysis that the courts previously applied to the custody determination will now 
apply to the prosecution’s ability to rebut the presumption.  The elimination of the totality of the 
circumstances analysis, and its replacement with a pro-defendant’s rights presumption allows a 
clear line to be drawn for police and law enforcement.  The presumption is also supported by the 
goal of ensuring that defendants know their rights, and the expectations of the general public.  
The presumption will also serve to foster an environment where it is commonplace for a 
defendant to be informed of his rights.  The principles that underlined the Supreme Court’s 
historically significant decision in Miranda v. Arizona must be upheld and protected in order to 
preserve the Constitutional rights afforded to individuals in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  
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Protection of those rights and of the integrity of the Constitution of the United States in criminal 
proceedings must be of the utmost importance in our criminal justice system.  This presumption 
allows for the protection of those rights, while still maintaining the ability of law enforcement to 
effectively perform their duties and protect societies.    
 
 
